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Abstract 
The advent of low-cost carriers has dramatically changed the competitive landscape of the airport 
industry and diminished the monopoly power that airports once enjoyed. Today, major airports 
compete directly with periphery airports, which are becoming the apparent choice of low-cost 
carriers. In fact, contracting with low-cost airlines has become a determinant factor in airport 
strategies, and airports now face a strategic decision to position themselves towards either low-
cost or full-service (legacy) airline, or both. This paper examines the impact of these competitive 
strategies on airport financial performance. Building on the strategic purity premise, we 
hypothesise that being either a low-cost-oriented or legacy-oriented airport (pursuing a pure 
strategy) is associated with superior financial performance, in comparison with combining the two 
(a hybrid strategy). Moreover, the benefit of pure strategies increases with the intensity of 
competition among nearby airports. The paper supports these hypotheses with findings drawn from 
the U.S. airport industry. 
Keywords: airport competition; competitive strategies; pure strategies; low-cost carriers; full-
service carriers 
1. Introduction 
After enjoying decades of monopoly power, airports are experiencing an increasingly competitive 
environment. Deregulation of aviation, the advent of low-cost carriers (LCCs), and 
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commercialisation and privatisation of airports are among the main factors that have reformed the 
competitive dynamics in the airport industry (Barret, 2000; Littlechild, 2018; Starkie, 2002). 
Airports compete for passengers and airlines through different channels. For instance, they may 
compete locally with adjacent airports—with overlapping catchment areas—or compete more 
broadly with distant airports in destination markets. They may also compete for connecting traffic 
or in non-aviation markets (Forsyth, 2006; Fröhlich and Niemeier, 2011). In particular, the rise of 
LCCs has enabled smaller airports to compete with major and established airports and 
revolutionised the market, the way airports make contracts with airlines, how they define their 
customer segment, and how they compete with each other (Francis, Humphreys, and Ison, 2004). 
Yet, apart from a few studies (e.g. Barrett, 2000; Gillen and Morrison, 2003; Fröhlich and 
Niemeier, 2011; Pels, Nijkamp, and Rietveld, 2003), the topic of airport competition has remained 
relatively unexplored. As Graham (2013) stresses, despite the significance of LCCs’ emergence, 
their impact on airport-airline relationships and airports’ competitive strategies is an overlooked 
topic in academic studies, despite being of much relevance not only for scholars but also for 
managers and policy makers. 
This paper is an attempt to respond to these shortcomings from a competitive strategy 
perspective. It has been well established in the competitive strategy literature that firms with pure 
strategy outperform those that apply hybrid strategies (e.g. Campbell-Hunt, 2000; Parnell, 1997, 
2006; Salavou, 2015). This literature goes back to Porter’s theory of competitive advantage, and 
it shows that mixing the cost leadership and differentiation strategies will result in poorer 
performance, compared to the pursuit of either of those generic strategies (Porter, 1980, 1985). We 
apply this strategic purity premise (Thornhill and White, 2007) in the context of the airport 
industry.  
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With the growing prevalence of LCCs and their substantial impact on competition in the 
airport industry, two distinguishable types of airports have emerged one oriented to attract LCCs, 
and the other specialised in serving legacy or major airlines. De Neufville (2008) calls these types 
“low-cost” and “legacy” airports, respectively, and notes that each is associated with certain 
difficult-to-combine or mutually exclusive requirements. Building on the above-mentioned 
strategic purity premise, we theorise that the airports that apply either of these pure competitive 
strategies have higher financial performance than the airports that use hybrid strategies (i.e. those 
that are “stuck in the middle” [Porter, 1980] and combine the two strategies). Moreover, when 
facing direct competition with an adjacent airport, it is imperative that airports take a clear 
competitive position—failing to do so results in even poorer performance. Accordingly, we, 
hypothesise that the stiffer the competition among airports, the more beneficial (detrimental) it is 
to apply pure (hybrid) strategies. We test our hypotheses in the U.S. airport industry and find robust 
and supportive results.  
This paper contributes to literature on both competitive strategy and the airport industry in 
several ways. In particular, the paper’s second hypothesis is an expansion of the strategic purity 
premise. Although there are numerous studies on strategic purity in different sectors (e.g. see 
Salavou [2015], for a recent review), very few have examined the pertinent contingencies under 
which pure strategies should outperform hybrid strategies.  (e.g. Hill, 1988; Shinkle, Kriauciunas, 
and Hundley, 2013). For example, Shinkle and colleagues (2013) show that pure strategies are 
more beneficial in market-oriented environments, compared to an institutional environment with 
a low degree of market orientation. Our study clearly contributes to this stream of research by 
showing that the competitive advantage (and hence, superior financial performance) obtained as a 
result of strategic purity is more profound in more competitive markets. More broadly, our paper 
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is among nascent studies (e.g. Barrett, 2000; Gillen and Morrison, 2003; Fröhlich and Niemeier, 
2011; Starkie, 2002) on airport competition and how that competition is affected by the growth of 
low-cost airlines. Notably, Lei and Papatheodorou (2010) call for further studies concerning the 
effects of LCCs on airport financial performance, and our paper directly responds to this (see 
Zuidberg, 2017, as a scarce example). Finally, in light of airports’ increasing involvement with 
private third parties (in various business aspects) and pressure from the highly competitive airline 
sector, even non-privatised airport managers must act in a more businesslike and market-oriented 
manner, which makes strategic positioning crucial. Showing evidence in favor of strategic purity 
premise in the airport industry can provide insights for airport managers concerned about their 
firms’ profitability in this increasingly competitive industry. 
In the remainder of this paper, we first briefly review the rise in airport rivalry as a result 
of LCCs’ emergence (section 2.1), and the literature on competitive strategy (section 2.2.). Next, 
we develop our hypotheses about airports’ competitive strategies in relation to low-cost or full-
service carriers (section 2.3). After introducing the sample and methodology behind our study in 
section 3, we test our hypotheses in the U.S. airport industry and provide the findings and 
robustness tests in section 4. We conclude the paper in section 5, by discussing the implications of 
our findings, the paper’s limitations, and our suggestions for further research. 
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
2.1. Impact of low-cost carriers on airport competition   
The advent of LCCs induced a dramatic reform in airports’ competitive dynamics. Before the 
emergence of LCCs, secondary or regional (periphery) airports could, at best, act as feeder points 
or wait for some seasonal charter traffic. However, with the appearance of LCCs, these isolated 
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airports began competing with the main (hub) airports (De Neufville, 2008). As a result of 
contracting with LCCs, periphery airports have experienced a sizeable rise in passenger traffic and 
stolen market share from nearby hub airports (Barret, 2000, 2004; Graham 2013). 
The typical LCC business model is built upon simplicity and cost efficiency in both product 
and process (Gillen and Morrison, 2003); the former is reflected in providing “no-frills” flights 
(i.e. only basic service to the passengers) and the latter in seeking minimal aeronautical charges 
and other operational costs (Francis et al., 2003), high utilisation of aircraft (Pitt and Brown, 2001), 
and shorter periods between arrivals and next departures (i.e. turnaround times) (Gillen and Gados, 
2008; Graham, 2013).  
While product cost saving—namely, by “unbundling” some of the flight services (such as 
in-flight food and baggage)—is the more apparent part of the LCC business model, the essential 
source of cost reduction for these airlines lies in process cost savings, such as on landing fees and 
other aeronautical charges for using airports facilities, and efficiency in utilising the aircraft and 
crew (Gillen and Gados, 2008). Therefore, choice of airports is a critical decision for LCCs. 
Periphery airports are the ideal option for these airlines because they offer low congestion and 
excess capacity; less expensive facilities and services; and lower aeronautical charges in exchange 
for growth in traffic. However, these advantages are not restricted to the small and periphery 
airports; the hub and major airports can also provide similar benefits to LCCs.  
As Graham (2013) points out, the real picture is more complicated than simply assuming 
periphery airports can best serve LCCs. On the contrary, a wide range of airports, including 
medium and large primary ones, are chosed by LCCs worldwide (Dobruszkes, 2006; Dobruszkes, 
Givoni, and Vowles, 2016; Graham and Dennis, 2007). Studies have even reported a very high 
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market share of LCCs at the largest U.S. airports (Abda, Belobaba, and Swelbar, 2012). This trend 
has opened up competition among various types of airports with different sizes and business 
models. Today, a main concern among airports is how to serve both LCCs and/or full-service 
carriers (FSCs). The decision to orient an airport towards serving LCCs or FSCs is now considered 
a competitive strategy of the airports (Gillen and Lall, 2004; Gillen and Morrison, 2003). As we 
discuss, this strategic decision significantly affects airport performance. 
2.2. Strategic purity premise 
A renowned premise in competitive strategy literature argues that firms pursuing a pure strategy 
outperform those that apply mixed or hybrid strategies (see Campbell-Hunt [2000] for a meta-
analysis). In his seminal studies, Porter (1980, 1985) argues that firms should apply either 
differentiation or cost leadership strategy; combining these two generic strategies leads to the so-
called “stuck-in-the-middle” situation, which ultimately results in inferior performance. Though 
Porter’s generic strategy is perhaps the best-known typology, a few others exist (e.g. the defender, 
prospector, and analyser strategies suggested by Miles and Snow [1978]). In any case, the 
superiority of pure strategy compared to hybrid or “confused” strategy (Wright, 1987) has received 
widespread, though not universal, support from numerous studies (e.g. Campbell-Hunt, 2000; Dess 
and Davis, 1984; Hambrick, 1981, 1982; Hawes and Crittenden, 1984; Salavou and Halikias, 
2009). 
The main theoretical benefits of the strategic purity are clarifying positioning, preventing 
confusion and complexity, and avoiding mutually exclusive trade-offs (Shinkle et al., 2013; 
Thornhill and White, 2007). First, hybrid strategies do not allow firms to a take a clear position in 
the market, and thus expose them to rivalry from two angles (i.e. competitors in cost leadership 
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and competitors in differentiation strategies) (Miles and Snow, 1978; Treacy and Wiersema, 1995). 
Second, due to their inherent complications, hybrid strategies may cause confusion, more complex 
managerial decisions, and higher costs of implication. Third, hybrid strategies may require their 
proponents to pursue different sets of activates that are mutually exclusive, as each strategy 
requires a distinct combination of resources, capabilities, and organisational structures and 
combining them may cause contradiction and conflict.  
As noted, widespread support for the strategic purity premise, especially in accordance 
with Porter’s generic strategies, can be seen in a broad range of industries such as shipping, 
banking, and hospital services (see Salavou [2015] for a recent review). Nevertheless, some 
research criticises this view and notes that hybrid strategies can be more appropriate in specific 
configurations (e.g. Hill, 1988; Murray, 1988)—for instance, in hypercompetitive environments 
(Gopalakrishna and Subramanian, 2001; Proff, 2000) or transition economies (Manev et al., 2015; 
Shinkle et al., 2013). After all, we believe that the core logic in favour of pure strategy is that each 
of the low-cost or differentiation strategies requires specific resources and organisational practices 
(Allen and Helms, 2006) which are mutually exclusive or at least hard to combine. Hence, it is   
imperative for the firm to employ one of the pure strategies, and not to mix them together. In line 
with this claim, we next investigate how strategic purity premise applies in the airport industry, 
concerning an airport’s inclination towards LCCs or FSCs.  
2.3. Strategic purity in the airport industry 
As the growth of LCCs has revolutionised competition in the airport industry, airports must now 
make decisions for dealing with LCCs and FSCs. Each type of carrier has a distinct business model 
and imposes different demands on airports, meaning that an airport’s relationship with LCCs and 
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FSCs is, in fact, a strategic decision (Gillen and Lall, 2004). For instance, LCCs require low airport 
charges, simple charging structures, quick turnaround times, swift check-in systems, and efficient 
local transportation (e.g. Barrett, 2004; Graham 2013). Many LCCs ask for aircraft parking stands 
just beside the terminals for embarking passengers in order to drop the cost of air bridges, and a 
simple terminal without extensive baggage, check-in, or business lounge services (Francis et al., 
2004). According to Barret’s (2004) interview with a chief executive at Ryanair, LCCs need 
“single-story” terminals, a requirement which is reflected in the simple structure of the Ryanair 
terminal at London Stansted Airport or the JetBlue terminal at Los Angeles’ Long Beach Airport. 
In contrast, the expensive and multi-purpose Terminal 5 at London’s Heathrow Airport cost 
roughly US$10 billion, with annual amortisation and operation expenses of US$30 dollars per 
passenger (De Neufville, 2008).  
Meeting the different needs of LCCs or FSCs leads to distinct and hard-to-reconcile 
strategic decisions, operations, and tactics, many of which require particular infrastructure and 
irreversible investments that can be categorised as sunk costs. Additionally, regarding pricing 
policies, airports must offer low landing fees and other charges in order to attract LCCs, and then 
compensate for this discount with a high volume of traffic. However, if the airport is already 
serving an FSC, changing may result in a conflict of interests or pressure from the incumbent to 
lower charges (i.e. as low as those that the new LCCs enjoy), which in turn diminishes the 
aeronautical revenue and may not be recouped by revenue generated from LCCs’ high traffic 
(Humphreys, Ison, and Francis, 2006). 
Importantly, airports have diverted from a traditional model (i.e. functioning merely as an 
infrastructure for serving airlines) to a commercial model (i.e. generating revenue, largely via non-
aeronautical business such as in-terminal shops and restaurants, parking, and car rentals) (e.g. 
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Gillen, 2011; Francis et al., 2004). Passengers flying with LCCs have different purchase 
behaviours from those flying with FSCs (Castillo-Manzano, 2010; Lei and Papatheodorou, 2010). 
For example, though LCC passengers purchase foods and beverages (Graham, 2009, 2008), 
speciality retail stores make most of their revenue from FSC passengers (Appold and Kasarda, 
2006). This variation demonstrates the need for specific, targeted services, products, and facilities 
for each “class” of passengers within terminals. Combining the two aims in one airport makes 
customer satisfaction and profitability difficult (if not impossible) to achieve. 
In line with the differences between LCC and FSC requirements, De Neufville (2008) 
makes a distinction between the airports that position themselves towards contracting with each of 
these two carrier types. He calls those airports focusing on LCCs “low-cost airports,” and those 
that mainly serve FSCs “legacy airports.” Low-cost airports are planned, managed, and developed 
very differently from legacy airports, and their respective business models differ accordingly (De 
Neufville, 2008). The conflicts arising from these distinct requirements makes the congruence of 
the two models non-optimal. Thus, we conclude the following: 
Hypothesis 1. There is a curvilinear (U-shape) relationship between the strategic purity 
of an airport and its financial performance; the higher the airport’s orientation to either 
low-cost or full-service carriers, the higher its performance. 
As the environment becomes more competitive, applying an effective strategy becomes 
even more crucial for gaining competitive advantage. We know from Hotelling’s model (1929), 
and its later expansion by Ferreira and Thisse (1996), that nearby firms try to differentiate 
(vertically) from each other and serve a particular segment of the market; otherwise, they will go 
through a price war which eventually drains their profits (Fröhlich and Niemeier, 2011). Hence, in 
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cases of neighbouring airports, which compete for passengers more profoundly than with other 
distant airports, we expect a clear strategic positioning of the airports: one airport will mainly serve 
FSCs and the other LCCs. In fact, several examples (e.g. airports within or close to London, Berlin, 
Paris, New York, and Rome) confirm this prediction (Fröhlich and Niemeier, 2011). 
As noted, one of the main benefits of pure strategies is that they protect the firm from 
rivals’ attacks on two fronts (Miles and Snow, 1978; Shinkle et al., 2013; Thornhill and White, 
2007); hybrid strategies are exposed to competition from both low-cost and differentiation 
strategies. The more competitors (i.e. points of attacks) that exist in the market, the more 
vulnerable the “in-the-middle” position becomes. Therefore, the pursuit of hybrid strategies (i.e. 
orienting an airport to both LCCs and FSCs almost evenly) is more detrimental for the airport´s 
performance the stiffer the competition with other (nearby) airports becomes. In a similar vein, 
Shinkle and co-authors (2013) posit that a market-orientated institutional environment (in 
transition economies), which increases the entry of foreign competitors, enhances the benefit of 
pure strategies. Thus, we conclude: 
Hypothesis 2. The curvilinear (U-shape) relationship between the strategic purity of an 
airport and its financial performance is more pronounced in more competitive situations; 
the performance benefit of the airport orientation to either low-cost or full-service carriers 
increases with competition intensity.  
3. Methodology  
3.1. Data collection 
We collected longitudinal data for the 150 busiest U.S. airports from 2006 to 2017. Airports’ 
financial data were obtained from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) database, one of the 
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main sources in U.S. aviation studies. The FAA requires that all U.S. commercial service airports 
annually file their financial reports in the Compliance Activity Tracking System, Form 127, which 
is publicly available for download. We used the same database to determine airports’ hub status 
and the area, in which the airports are located, from which we compute the number of airports 
serving the same city market, as our measure of competition intensity. The airport traffic data and 
data for the market share of major airlines at a given airport were obtained from the U.S. Bureau 
of Transportation Statistics (BTS), “Airport Snapshots” section. BTS (“Schedule P-6” in the “Air 
Carrier Financial” section and “Air Carrier Traffic & Capacity T-1” in the “Air Carrier Summary 
Data) is also our source for the airlines’ financial data, from which we build our indicator for 
distinguishing LCCs from FSCs. After eliminating observations with missing data about the 
airlines’ market share, airlines’ financial data, and airports’ total passengers and assets, our final 
sample consisted of 1451 observations, associated with 150 airports for the twelve years from 2006 
to 2017. We gather Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in millions of current USD, population density 
in person per square mile, and House Price Index (HPI) data with 2000 as the base year, all of 
which have been used in robustness analyses, from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Census 
Bureau, and Federal Housing Finance Agency, respectively.  
3.2. Variables 
Our dependent variable is airport financial performance measured by operating profit (in millions 
of U.S. dollars), which covers profit from all aeronautical and non-aeronautical operations. In 
particular, revenue obtained from airline landing fees, terminal arrival fees, land and non-terminal 
facility leases, in-terminal food and beverage sales, duty-free sales, parking and ground 
transportation, and the like subtracted from operating expenses such as personnel compensation 
and benefits, supplies and materials, communications and utilities, and the like.  
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Our main independent variable is the strategic purity of the airports. To measure an 
airport’s strategic purity, we must first distinguish LCCs from FSCs. Previous studies detail the 
challenges in accurately defining LCCs and question the dichotomous indicator of being low-cost 
or not (Fageda, Suau-Sanchez, and Mason, 2015), or defining LCCs by the charged ticket price 
(De Neufville, 2008) or the size of the airport they serve (Graham and Dennis, 2007).  
Some papers have reported cost per available seat mile (CASM) as a metric that differs 
notably for FSCs versus LCCs (De Neufville, 2008; Gillen and Gados, 2008; Gillen and Morrison, 
2003) and thus serves as a useful differentiator between the two. As Hüschelrath and Müller (2011) 
assert, despite disagreement about the precise definition of LCCs (e.g. lack of business class seats, 
type of chosen airports, level of in-flight services, etc.), the common denominator for all LCCs is, 
indeed, low CASM. Accordingly, we identify LCCs (or FSCs) by transportation-related expenses 
per available seat mile1. The lower this variable, the closer the airline is to an LCC model, and the 
higher it is, the more likely it is that the airline follows an FSC model. Using CASM and the market 
share of the five major airlines at a given airport, we compute an airport’s strategic purity as 
follows: 
 Strategic purity𝑖𝑗 =
∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑒j,k  ×
n
k=1 MSijk                      ;  for airport 𝑖 at year 𝑗,  
where MSijk is the market share (based on enplaned passengers, both arriving and departing) 
of the airline k at year j in the airport i. Hence, low (or high) value for the strategic purity variable 
indicates the airport is dominated by LCCs (or FSCs), indicating the airport’s orientation towards 
                                                          
1 Using passengers food cost per available seat mile, as an alternative measure, does not change 
our main results (not reported here, but available from authors upon request). 
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pure strategies. Whereas, the airport with a value in the middle of the spectrum is one in which 
both types of airlines operate comparatively alike—a hybrid strategy. To reduce the skewness, the 
natural logarithm of this variable is incorporated into our models.  
To test our second hypothesis, we use the (spatial) competition intensity among airports as 
the moderator variable (i.e. its interaction with our independent variable) measured by the number 
of airports that serve the same city market—applying the “city market id” suggested by U.S. 
Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) to “consolidate airports serving the same city market”2 
, and consistent with previous studies (e.g., De Neufville, 1995; Van Dender, 2007). The main 
effect of this variable has been added to the control variables set, as follows. 
In addition, we include a set of control variables in our model: hub status of the airport 
(large, medium, small hub, or non-hub airport), the (natural logarithm of) total passengers flying 
to/from the airport, and (the natural logarithm of) the airport’s total assets as a proxy for airport 
size (Bel, and Fageda, 2010; Van Dender, 2007). We also control for the airport concentration—
that is, the concentration of airlines (regarding passengers’ enplanement) within each airport using 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. The higher the concentration of airlines operating within an 
airport, the lower that airport’s bargaining power is, which can affect its financial performance. In 
addition, the concentration of airlines in a given airport, the higher the competition is among 
airlines, which reduced the ticket price and boost traffic, which again affect the airport financial 
performance. Finally, obtaining the data from Oum and colleagues (2006), we account for different 
governance and ownership structure of the airports, using dummy variables for being city-owned, 
county-owned, governed by the airport authority, or otherwise. 
                                                          
2 see here https://www.transtats.bts.gov/Glossary.asp?index=C 
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It is worth noting that we intentionally elected not to include airport fixed effects in our 
models. As the number of rival airports in a city market is time invariant, by the inclusion of airport 
fixed effects we cannot estimate the impact of this variable. Additionally (and most importantly), 
incorporating airport fixed effects makes the coefficient of strategic purity statistically 
insignificant (the result are not reported here but available upon request). We believe the main 
reason for this result is that within the period of our panel data (12 years), the dominance of LCCs 
or FSCs (hence, our strategic purity variable) does not change substantially. The airline-airport 
contract tends to be a long-term one—15 to 30 years according to Sabel (2004). Therefore, the 
effect of strategic purity from airport fixed effects is not easily distinguishable (Van Dender, 2007).   
3.3. Model specification  
For testing the first hypothesis, we use ordinary least square (OLS) regression, as follows:  
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
2 +  𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛵𝑡 +
 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
where Xit is a vector of control variables and Tt is the year fixed effects. As we expect to 
see a curvilinear (U-shaped) impact of strategic purity on operating profit, its quadratic (i.e. 
squared) term is added into the model. The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
clustered at airport level to account for any arbitrary correlation among observations belonging to 
the same airport. Examining the second hypothesis, we add the competition intensity variable and 
its interaction with strategic purity. In this model, we evaluate the strategic purity premise at 
different levels of competition in the city market in which the airport operates: 
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𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
2 +
𝛽3 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽5 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
2 × 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛵𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  
As we have strategic purity, strategic purity squared, and their interactions with 
competition intensity, for an easier interpretation, we normalise the strategic purity variable to be 
always positive, before incorporating it into all models. Specifically, strategic purity is 
transformed to [standardised (strategic purity) + 8]/2. 
4. Findings 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics and correlations of the dependent, independent, and 
control variables. Strategic purity has a positive correlation with airport operating profit. 
Competition intensity also correlates positively with operating profit. However, one may question 
the competition intensity variable— measured by the number of rival airports in the same city—
for being endogenous.  Large cities, which are more likely to be served by multiple airports, have 
qualitatively different demographic and economic situations than small cities, which usually have 
only one airport. These characteristics (e.g. higher population density, citizens’ income and salary, 
etc.) can affect the demand for the airports and, eventually, their operating profit. In our 
econometric analyses, we deal with this potential endogeneity by applying a two-stage least square 
model, as described in section 4.  
Airports with low (high) values of strategic purity are oriented towards LCCs (FSCs). For 
instance, Atlantic City International Airport with an average strategic purity of 1.49 is among 
airports that are highly oriented towards (i.e., dominated by) LCCs, while Charlotte Douglas 
International Airport with an average strategic purity of 4.49 is among airports on the other side 
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of the spectrum, that is, FSC oriented airports. All of these airports are associated with, relatively, 
pure strategies, and we expect a favourable financial performance for them. Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of the strategic purity variable. Although the variable has been used after a natural 
logarithm transformation, the histogram still shows a skewness toward higher levels. We deal with 
this potential problem in the robustness analysis section. 
**Insert Figure 1 about here** 
**Insert Table 1 about here** 
Table 2 reports the results of conducting our OLS model. In Model 1 only control variables 
are included. In Model 2, we incorporate strategic purity and strategic purity squared for testing 
Hypothesis 1. Model 3 contains a full set of variables, including competition intensity and its 
interactions, for testing Hypothesis 2.  
As Model 2 depicts, the linear term of strategic purity is negative and statistically 
significant (β= -43.54, p-value<0.05), its square term is positive and significant (β= 6.65, p-
value<0.05). Hence, the functional form of operating profit in terms of strategic purity depicts a 
U-shaped relationship; as strategic purity increases, the operating profit decreases up to a certain 
point, after which it rises monotonically. 
In Figure 2, using the estimated coefficients for strategic purity variables (all else equal), 
we plot the fitted value of operating profit. In line with the above explanation, we can see the U-
shaped relationship between strategic purity and financial performance of the airport within our 
sample range, which supports our first hypothesis: for both high and low values of strategic purity 
the operating profit will be high, while for the moderate values the operating profit is low. In other 
words, airport financial performance is at a maximum when the airport is dominated by either 
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LCCs or FSCs, and it is at a minimum when the airport is “stuck in the middle”—that is, when 
both LCCs and FSCs operate in the airport at a comparatively similar level.  
**Insert Figure 2 about here** 
Model 3 in Table 2 shows the results with a full set of variables included. While the 
coefficient of strategic purity squared is negative and significant (β= -23.56, p-value<0.05), the 
coefficient of its interaction with competition intensity is significantly positive (β= 23.876.04, p-
value<0.01). This finding means that the net effect of strategic purity squared is always positive. 
The coefficient of strategic purity linear is positive and significant (β= 158.01, p-value<0.05), and 
the coefficient of its interaction with competition intensity is significantly negative (β= -162.13, 
p-value<0.01). With an identical explanation as earlier, this pattern implies a U-shaped curve for 
the relationship between operating profit and strategic purity.  
Moreover, higher competition intensity means a higher absolute magnitude for the positive 
coefficient of competition intensity interacted with strategic purity squared. Hence, the net effect 
of strategic purity squared is higher which implies steeper tails for the U-shaped graph3. In other 
words, for higher levels of competition intensity, once the airport deviates from pure strategies 
(i.e. approaches towards the middle point), the operating profit declines more sharply than in 
situations with lower levels of competition. Thus, strategic purity has a stronger effect on 
performance when _competition is more intensive, which supports our second hypothesis.  
**Insert Table 2 about here** 
                                                          
3 In the mathematical function of y= α . x + β . x2, for being a U-shaped curve, β should be 
positive (negative β implies an inverted U-shaped); the absolute magnitude of β determines the 
steepness or flatness of the curve. Yet, the sign of α only determines the location of the curve in 
the x-y surface and is irrelevant to the shape of the curve. 
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For a more straightforward interpretation, Figure 3 plots the fitted value of operating profit 
for different levels of competition intensity (using the coefficients from Table 2, Model 3), all else 
equal. Interestingly, in the monopoly situation (where competition intensity is equal to one), the 
curve is almost horizontal; this means that for all degrees of strategic purity of the airport, the 
operating profit remains fairly constant. However, consistent with our hypotheses and the strategic 
purity premise, in more competitive environments, the relationship between strategic purity and 
operating profit is a U-shaped one.  
As the number of rival airports (i.e. competition intensity) increases, the U-shaped curve 
becomes steeper. In line with our second hypothesis, with more airports in a city market (i.e. more 
intensive competition), the financial performance gap between “stuck-in-the-middle” (hybrid 
strategy) airports and “pure strategy” airports (either LCC-oriented or FSC-oriented) becomes 
more sizable. Thus, the strategic purity premise is more pronounced in intensively competitive 
situations.  
**Insert Figure 3 about here** 
 A surprising point from the above figures is the differential financial performance within 
the pure strategies— focusing on LCCs versus FSCs. As Figure 2 shows, airports with a focus on 
LCCs (i.e. lower values of strategic purity) seem to perform better than airports where FSCs are 
the major airlines (i.e. higher values of strategic purity)4. Although our theoretical framework only 
hypothesises about the performance impact of pure versus hybrid strategies, this last result could 
be worthwhile for more scrutiny in a different study. In non-reported results, we have checked and 
                                                          
4 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this point.   
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found out that these differences in performance between FSC-oriented airports and LCC-oriented 
airports are not statistically significant.  
5. Robustness analysis 
As noted, our OLS model may suffer from endogeneity of the competition intensity variable. 
Larger cities, which tend to be served by more than one airport,   may have specific characteristics 
that affect airport performance. We address this issue by estimating a two-stage least square 
(2SLS) model using instrument variables, which are correlated with our endogenous variables but 
uncorrelated with the error term (Greene, 2008). In fact, Fröhlich and Niemeier (2011) mention 
population size (along with income level) among the essential factors that determine the number 
of airports in a region. Accordingly, we run a 2SLS model, using (the natural logarithm of) gross 
domestic product (GDP), house price index (HPI), and (the natural logarithm of) population 
density of the metropolitan area in which the airport is located as instrumental variables for 
competition intensity. These variables correlate with the number of airports located in a given city 
market; yet, as city aggregate variables, they are not supposedly correlated with the error term in 
our airport-level model (i.e. unobserved attributes of each airport). By the same logic, the 
interactions between competition intensity and strategic purity (both liner and quadratic term) are 
also instrumented by the interactions of variables mentioned above with linear and quadratic forms 
of strategic purity.   
Table 3 shows the results obtained from the above 2SLS and former OSL models. The 
2SLS model corroborates the results of our OLS model. In particular, in Model 2, while the 
coefficient of strategic purity squared is negative and significant (β= -29.89, p-value<0.01), the 
coefficient of its interaction with competition intensity is positive and significant (β= 27.75, p-
value<0.05); a similar pattern to our original findings, as reported again in Model 1 for comparison.   
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One can argue that our selected instrumental variables are in fact drivers of the operating 
profit and correlate with the error term5. Although GDP and the population density of the area, 
theoretically, can impact the operating profit of airport located in that area—translating to higher 
demand for flight—, the HPI (i.e. house price index) should not have any impact on airport profits 
once we control for GDP and population density. Accordingly, to deal with this potential issue, as 
another robustness check, we only use HPI (and its interactions with strategic purity and strategic 
purity squared) as instrumental variable and treat GDP and population density as additional control 
variables in a 2SLS model. The results are reported in Model 3 of Table 3 and qualitatively similar 
to those of previous models, though the strategic purity linear and its interaction with competition 
intensity is marginally significant. Drawing the fitted value plots using estimations from Model 2 
and Model 3 leads to similar graphs as in Figure 3 (not reported here, but available from authors 
upon request). 
**Insert Table 3 about here** 
Further, we also investigate various post-estimation tests to be sure about the empirical 
relevance and validity of our instrumental variables. The outputs of Panel A and B in Table 4 
correspond to the 2SLS Model 2 and Model 3 in Table 2, respectively. For instance, as Panel A 
shows, the Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) test, a modified and improved version of Angrist 
and Pischke (2009) test, rejects the null hypothesis of weak- or under-identification of each of the 
endogenous regressors. Moreover, the joint significance of our instruments is confirmed by the 
Stock-Wright test. Rejecting the null hypothesis means that our instruments are not weak (Stock 
and Yogo, 2005; Stock and Wright, 2000).  
                                                          
5 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this point.   
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In addition, the result of over-identification (Sargan-Hansen) test shows we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis for the Hansen J statistic, which indicates the validity of our instruments (i.e. 
no correlation with the error term). The test assumes that one instrument is valid and then tests for 
the validity of all other instruments (i.e. whether the instruments are uncorrelated with the error 
term in the second stage). Finally, both Durbin and Wu-Hausman score tests reject that competition 
intensity and its interaction terms with strategic purity linear and squared term are exogenous, as 
we predicted. All tests (in Panel B) are also supportive of our 2SLS Model 3 in Table 2. It should 
be noted that the Hansen J shows the model is exactly identified, as the number of instrumental 
variables is equal to the number of endogenous regressors. 
**Insert Table 4 about here** 
Finally, we run an OLS model with all HPI, GDP, and population density as control 
variables to make sure that any omitted variable bias does not drive our original results. As Model 
4 in Table 3 shows, the results corroborate our previous findings. However, one should be cautious 
in interpreting these results, since in these last regressions the potential endogeneity of competition 
intensity has not been dealt with6.  
5. Conclusions 
                                                          
6 In order to test the robustness of our findings to possible outliers’ effects and violation of the 
normality assumption, first, we run our OLS model while computing the standard error by a 
bootstrapping method, which without assuming any specific distribution bases its estimations on 
the empirical distribution obtained from the re-sampling iteration. Bootstrapped standard errors 
are asymptotically more accurate than the ones derived from the normality assumption (Greene, 
2008). Second, we apply a median regression, which is more resistant to the influence of outliers 
(Koenker and Bassett, 1978; Koenker and Quantile, 2005). The results derived from both 
bootstrapping and median regression (available upon request) are qualitatively the same as before, 
which lends additional support to our findings. 
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We find that in the context of the U.S. airport industry, pure competitive strategies outperform the 
hybrid ones; contracting mainly with either legacy airlines or mainly with low-cost carriers yields 
better financial performance for an airport than mixing the two aims. The underpinning reason for 
this result, we argue, is the conflicting requirements for dealing with low-cost versus full-service 
(or legacy) airlines. Attracting these different types of airlines (and their associated passengers) 
necessitates particular kinds of investment, infrastructure, and pricing schemes, making it 
ineffective to conduct them simultaneously. In line with the strategic purity premise, the optimal 
strategy is to position the airport to serve either low-cost or legacy airlines, rather than leaving it 
“stuck in the middle.”  
We also find that the financial benefit of strategic purity increases as competition becomes 
stiffer, as it does in multi-airport cities. Interestingly, in a monopoly situation, the choice of 
strategy barely affects airports’ profits. That is, being anywhere on the pure or hybrid strategy 
spectrum does not have a significant impact on an airport’s profit—the curve is almost horizontal 
(see Figure 3). However, in all cities with more than one airport, first, the curve is U-shaped, in 
accordance with the strategic purity premise; and second, we see a clear steepness in the tails of 
the curves as the number of airports in the multi-airport cities increases (i.e. as competition 
increases).  
Further, we introduce a continuous measure for distinguishing between low-cost and 
differentiation strategies, based on airports’ orientation towards LCCs versus FSCs. By going 
beyond the dichotomous measure of pure versus hybrid that is applied by the majority of previous 
studies (see Thornhill and White [2007] and Manev et al. [2015] for two rare exceptions), our 
paper contributes empirically to the extant literature. This refined measure “enables us to examine 
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relative strategy emphasis and thereby evaluate the stuck-in-the-middle hypothesis more directly 
than has been possible with prior operationalisations” (Thornhill and White, 2007: 554).  
Like any study, our work is not without limitations. First, some of the arguments that we 
use to defend the advantages of strategic purity could be alleviated if the (large) airports can use 
different terminals for different types of airlines (i.e. LCCs or FSCs)7. Yet, our theoretical 
argument is not only based on the different terminal requirements for LCCs versus FSCs. As we 
have explained in section 2.3, airports that have different terminals have the same landing tracks; 
this means that from a regulatory perspective it looks hard to justify why landing fees should 
depend on which terminal the airline uses. Moreover, local transportation to the city is the same 
across terminals, and FSC passengers may have different local transportation need than LCC 
passenger. Therefore, we believe, being flexible regarding the terminal does not fully overcome 
the problems inherited to the hybrid strategies. Nevertheless, having detailed data about airports 
terminals specialization into different types of airlines could enrich our analyses, and it should be 
the subject of future research.  
Another expansion of our study could involve measuring competition intensity differently 
than we do. For instance, one can go beyond the spatial competition by considering competition 
for destinations or for connecting passengers, where even airports with no nearby rivals compete 
with distant airports (Fröhlich and Niemeier, 2011). Second, despite being state owned, U.S. 
airports are privately operated, and their operations are highly contracted out to private third parties 
(Gillen, 2011; Gillen and Morrison, 2003). Pressure from these private firms—as well as FAA 
requirements for being as self-sustaining as possible —means that profitability is the core (though 
                                                          
7 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this point.   
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maybe not the only) objective for any U.S. airport (Carney and Mew, 2003). Nevertheless, our 
study could be expanded to other institutional environments, with different levels of privatisation 
and regulation (Adler and Liebert, 2014), such as fully privatised airports in the United Kingdom 
(Littlechild, 2018). Moreover, as mentioned earlier, our empirical findings show an apparent 
difference in operating profit between FSC-oriented and LCC-oriented airports. Although this 
difference within pure strategies is beyond the scope of our hypotheses (i.e., the difference between 
pure and hybrid strategies), it is worthwhile to be investigated at length. Finally, our sample 
skewed towards cities with only one airport. Expanding the sample to cover other areas, such as 
Canada or Europe, could be one solution that incorporates more non-monopoly situations. We 
hope that these limitations and suggestions will inspire others to initiate further research in this 
regard. 
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  Figure 1. Distribution of Strategic purity 
 
Low (high) values for strategic purity correspond to LCC-focused (FSC-focused) airports. 
 
Figure 2. Fitted value for operating profit  
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The coefficients estimation in Table 2, Model 2 is used for computing the fitted values. Low (high) values for strategic 
purity correspond to LCC-focused (FSC-focused) airports; a pure strategy. Medium values for values for strategic 
purity correspond to hybrid strategies. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Fitted value for operating profit at different levels of competition intensity 
 
The coefficients estimation in Table 2, Model 3 is used for computing the fitted values. Low (high) values for strategic 
purity correspond to LCC-focused (FSC-focused) airports; a pure strategy. Medium values for values for strategic 
purity correspond to hybrid strategies. 
 
31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Correlation matrix and descriptive statistics 
Panel A 
Variable  N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Operating profit  1451 12.78 44.63 -109.49 318.43 
Strategic purity  1451 3.99 0.51 0.38 4.53 
Competition intensity  1451 1.56 1.16 1.00 6.00 
Airport concentration  1451 0.25 0.18 0.04 0.98 
Ln(total passengers)  1451 8.31 1.33 5.53 11.41 
Ln(total asset)  1451 19.79 1.52 10.75 23.03 
Ln (GDP)  1406 11.14 1.30 8.50 14.32 
HPI  1434 144.87 30.59 70.69 260.46 
Ln(Population density)  1434 5.91 1.07 2.43 8.02 
 
 
Panel B 
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.Operating profit  1.00        
2.Strategic purity  0.21        
3.Competition intensity  0.26 0.02       
4.Airport concentration  -0.05 -0.29 0.27      
5.Ln(total passengers)  0.44 0.51 0.25 0.04     
6.Ln(total asset)  0.40 0.43 0.05 -0.07 0.81    
32 
 
7. Ln (GDP)  0.35 0.30 0.66 0.24 0.74 0.53   
8.HPI  0.23 0.01 0.36 0.11 0.08 0.01 0.23  
9. Ln(Population density)  0.27 0.18 0.58 0.17 0.52 0.36 0.75 0.17 
All correlations with bold font are significant at the 0.05 level or better. N=1406 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. OLS regression for operating profit 
Variables Model 3 Model 2 Model 1 
Strategic purity 158.01* -43.54*  
 (64.11) (20.98)  
Strategic purity^2 -23.56* 6.65*  
 (9.49) (3.34)  
Strategic purity × Competition intensity -162.13**   
 (58.75)   
Strategic purity^2 × Competition intensity 23.87**   
 (8.52)   
Competition intensity 272.03** 9.42* 9.01* 
 (99.70) (3.81) (3.78) 
Airport concentration 1.73 -21.48 -21.73 
 (11.16) (13.59) (13.64) 
Ln(total passengers) 7.96* 4.02 4.05 
 (3.44) (3.35) (3.16) 
Ln(total asset) 4.12* 4.95* 5.12* 
 (2.06) (2.06) (2.13) 
Hub status dummies YES YES YES 
Governance dummies YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES 
Constant -372.22** -21.79 -88.94+ 
 (125.84) (54.15) (50.63) 
Observations 1451 1451 1451 
R2 0.44 0.40 0.40 
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Adjusted R2 0.43 0.39 0.39 
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
All models are OLS regressions with clustered (by airport) robust standard errors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. OLS and 2SLS regression for operating profit 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4   
Variables OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS   
Strategic purity 158.01* 197.08* 213.44+ 165.87*   
 (64.11) (79.12) (114.68) (65.01)   
Strategic purity^2 -23.56* -29.89** -35.49* -24.79*   
 (9.49) (11.45) (17.55) (9.66)   
Strategic purity × Competition intensity -162.13** -187.31* -181.60+ -161.44**   
 (58.75) (77.15) (94.61) (59.47)   
Strategic purity^2 × Competition intensity 23.87** 27.75* 29.38* 23.60**   
 (8.52) (11.11) (14.16) (8.63)   
Competition intensity 272.03** 309.51* 267.84+ 274.76**   
 (99.70) (131.42) (157.96) (100.50)   
Airport concentration 1.73 5.24 20.89 1.21   
 (11.16) (15.39) (22.39) (12.73)   
Ln(total passengers) 7.96* 10.23* 16.10* 11.41*   
 (3.44) (4.10) (6.69) (4.49)   
Ln(total asset) 4.12* 3.85 3.37 4.67+   
 (2.06) (2.55) (4.45) (2.68)   
Ln (GDP)   -4.00 -3.17   
   (11.32) (3.16)   
Ln(Population density)   -1.87 -0.81   
   (3.79) (2.80)   
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HPI    0.09   
    (0.08)   
Hub status dummies YES YES YES YES   
Governance dummies YES YES YES YES   
Year dummies YES YES YES YES   
Constant -372.22** -443.76** -428.50* -401.56**   
 (125.84) (163.08) (205.05) (136.45)   
Observations 1451 1406 1406 1406   
R2 0.44 0.44 0.38 0.45   
Adjusted R2 0.43 0.43 0.37 0.43   
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Model 1 is OLS regression with clustered (by airport) robust standard errors.  
Model 2 is the second stage of 2SLS regressions with clustered (by airport) robust standard errors. 
In Model 2, Competition intensity, Strategic purity × Competition intensity, and Strategic purity^2 × Competition intensity are 
instrumented by Ln(GDP), HPI, Ln(Population density), Strategic purity × Ln(GDP), Strategic purity^2 × Ln(GDP), Strategic 
purity × HPI, Strategic purity^2 × HPI, Strategic purity × Ln(Population density), and Strategic purity^2 × Ln(Population density). 
In Model 3, Competition intensity, Strategic purity × Competition intensity, and Strategic purity^2 × Competition intensity are 
instrumented by HPI, Strategic purity × HPI, and Strategic purity^2 × HPI. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Under-identification, weak instrument, over-identification, and exogeneity tests 
Panel A 
Instrumented Variable Sanderson-Windmeijer 
under-identification test 
Sanderson-Windmeijer 
weak-identification test 
Competition intensity SW Chi-sq(7) = 75.43 
p=0.000 
F(7, 132)= 10.45 
p=0.000 
Strategic purity × Competition intensity SW Chi-sq(7)= 75.57 
p=0.000 
F(7, 132)= 10.47 
p=0.000 
Strategic purity^2 × Competition 
intensity 
SW Chi-sq(7)= 75.34 
p=0.000 
F(7, 132)= 10.44 
p=0.000 
Stock-Wright LM S statistic for joint 
significance of endogenous regressors 
Chi-square(7)= 13.66   p=0.05 
Over-identification test of all instruments (H0: instruments are valid) 
Hansen J statistic: 6.61 
Chi-sq(6) p = 0.35 
Endogeneity test for instrumented variables (H0: Regressors are exogenous) 
Durbin test Chi-square (3)= 6.51  p=0.08 
Wu–Hausman test F(3, 1376)= 2.13     p = 0.09 
 
Panel B 
Instrumented Variable Sanderson-Windmeijer 
under-identification test 
Sanderson-Windmeijer 
weak-identification test 
Competition intensity SW Chi-sq(1) = 10.94 
p=0.009 
F(1, 132)= 10.64 
p=0.001 
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Strategic purity × Competition intensity SW Chi-sq(1)= 14.38 
p=0.000 
F(1, 132)= 13.99 
p=0.000 
Strategic purity^2 × Competition 
intensity 
SW Chi-sq(1)= 17.17 
p=0.000 
F(1, 132)= 16.70 
p=0.000 
Stock-Wright LM S statistic for joint 
significance of endogenous regressors 
Chi-square(3)= 12.50    p=0.005 
Over-identification test of all instruments (H0: instruments are valid) 
Hansen J statistic: (equation exactly identified) 
Endogeneity test for instrumented variables (H0: Regressors are exogenous) 
Durbin test Chi-square (3)= 18.67  p=0.003 
Wu–Hausman test F(3, 1374)= 6.16     p = 0.004 
Panel A corresponds to the 2SLS Model 2 in Table 3, in which Competition intensity, Strategic purity × 
Competition intensity, and Strategic purity^2 × Competition intensity are instrumented by Ln(GDP), HPI, 
Ln(Population density), Strategic purity × Ln(GDP), Strategic purity^2 × Ln(GDP), Strategic purity × HPI, Strategic 
purity^2 × HPI, Strategic purity × Ln(Population density), and Strategic purity^2 × Ln(Population density). Panel B 
corresponds to the 2SLS Model 3 in Table 3, in which Competition intensity, Strategic purity × Competition intensity, and 
Strategic purity^2 × Competition intensity are instrumented by HPI, Strategic purity × HPI, and Strategic purity^2 × HPI. 
 
 
 
 
